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In spite of shallow financial markets, Sub-Saharan Africa 
will not escape the repercussions of the global financial 
crisis. The global turmoil threatens the progress Sub-
Saharan Africa has made in financial sector deepening 
and broadening over the recent years and underlines the 
importance of continuing and deepening the necessary 
institutional reforms. In this context it is important to 
define the role of government in expanding financial 
sectors in a sustainable and market-friendly manner.  
Foreign banks have brought more benefits than risks 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Department, Africa Region—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to understand financial sector development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Policy Research Working Papers 
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for their host economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, but 
are certainly not a panacea and not a substitute for 
institutional and policy reform. The profile of foreign 
banks, however, has changed, with more and more 
regional banks emerging. This trend toward regional 
integration is promising as it might allow the small 
African financial system to reap benefits from scale 
economies, but it also requires regulatory and supervisory 
improvements and coordination across the region. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Hope has been in the air for finance in Africa. Financial systems across the continent 
have become deeper, more efficient, and more stable over the past several years. While the 
global crisis will affect Sub-Saharan Africa as much as other developing countries in the world—
though mostly through real rather than financial channels—today its financial sectors are in a 
better position to weather the global turmoil than they have been in the past and can help their 
host economies smooth the impact of the crisis. Nevertheless, the increasing integration of Africa 
into the global economy through capital flows and foreign direct investment in the financial 
sector poses new challenges for policymakers and underlines the importance of well-informed 
financial-sector policy.  
This paper will discuss recent trends in African financial systems and focus on two major 
but controversial policy issues: the role of government and the role of foreign banks. Debates on 
both issues have changed dramatically over the past decades. The approach of governments 
replacing markets was seen as necessary in the 1960s and 1970s; this changed into an almost 
laissez-faire approach focusing on liberalization and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s, before 
the pendulum swung back somewhat toward a more active, albeit different, role for government 
during the past 10 years. Similarly, the attitude toward integration into global financial markets 
has changed dramatically over the past decades and will surely be further influenced by the 
ongoing financial crisis. Some countries went full circle, from nationalizing foreign banks in the 
1960s and 1970s to privatizing failed government-owned banks to international banks in the 
1990s. The profile of foreign banks in Africa, however, has changed, as we will discuss below.  
Financial-sector policies have become a centerpiece in the debate on how to foster 
growth in low-income countries and reduce stark poverty levels. Over the past 15 years, ample  3
evidence using different aggregation levels and methodologies has been accumulated on the 
growth-enhancing effect of financial-sector development.
1 It is primarily through improvements 
in resource allocation and productivity growth that finance helps economies grow faster.
2 
Financial deepening helps especially those industries more dependent on external finance,
3 and 
also helps to reduce financing constraints, particularly for smaller firms.
4 Financial deepening 
has thus a transformative effect on economies, shaping the industrial structure, the firm size 
distribution, and even organizational structures.
5 Cross-country comparisons also show a pro-
poor effect of financial deepening:
6 it is the poorest quintile that sees their income share grow 
fastest with financial deepening, and countries with deeper financial systems experience faster 
reductions in poverty levels.  
After a decade of macroeconomic and financial reforms, the shallowness of finance in 
Africa is worrying, especially given the potential that finance has to foster economic growth and 
meet the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty levels by 2015. However, there have 
been promising trends and developments. The next section of this paper presents the current 
status of finance in Africa and some promising trends. The third and fourth sections focus on two 
critical areas: the role of governments in deepening and broadening financial systems in Africa 
and the role of foreign banks. The final section concludes and looks forward.  
 
                                                            
1 This is not to downplay the reverse causation from economic development to deeper and more sophisticated 
financial systems. 
2 Beck et al. 2000; Love, 2003; Wurgler, 2000. 
3 Rajan and Zingales 1998. 
4 Beck et al. 2005. 
5 Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006. 
6 Beck et al. 2007.  4
2. FINANCE IN AFRICA: GROWING FROM A LOW LEVEL 
Given the central importance of finance for economic development and poverty 
alleviation, the superficiality of African finance is alarming. African financial systems are small, 
both in absolute terms as in relative terms. Figures 1 and 2 show the ratio of liquid liabilities to 
GDP and the log of liquid liabilities in US dollars, respectively, with data for 2007. With a few 
exceptions—such as Mauritius, South Africa, and a handful of offshore financial centers—
African financial systems are among the smallest across the globe, both in absolute terms and 
relative to economic activity. Many African financial systems are smaller than a mid-sized bank 
in continental Europe, with total assets often less than US$1 billion. Small size is connected to 
low productivity and skill shortages, and prevents banks from exploiting scale economies; in 
addition, it might deter them from undertaking large investments in technology. In addition, 
Africa’s financial systems are characterized by very limited outreach, with less than one in five 
households having access to any formal banking service—savings, payments, or credit (Figure 
3). Again, this in stark contrast not only to continental Europe, where access to a checking 
account is taken for granted, but also to other regions of the developing world, where penetration 
rates are typically between 30 and 50 percent. Behind these low numbers, however, is some 
intra-regional variation, with banking penetration surpassing 40 percent in South Africa but 
remaining below 20 percent in most of East Africa. 
Banking is also very expensive in Africa, as reflected by high interest spreads and 
margins (Figure 4).
7 This spread between deposit and lending interest rates provides 
disincentives for both savings and lending, as it depresses the returns for savers and pushes 
                                                            
7 We denote spreads as the difference between ex-ante contracted loan and deposit interest rates and margins as the 
actually received interest (and non-interest) revenue on loans minus the interest costs on deposits (minus non-
interest charges on deposits).  5
lending interest rates up. Compared to other regions of the world, financial systems in Africa 
also have higher levels of overhead costs (Figure 5). High spreads, margins, and overhead costs 
can be explained by the same factors as the low levels of financial depth, shown above in Figures 
1 and 2. The absence of scale economies and the very high risks due to weak and 
underdeveloped contractual frameworks and economic and political volatility drive up banking 
costs and reduce time horizons for both investors and borrowers. These costs make outreach to 
savers and borrowers who need small transactions commercially unviable. Decomposition of 
interest spreads and cross-country comparisons of interest margins typically point to the small 
size of African banking systems, deficient contractual frameworks, and limited protection of 
property rights as an explanation of the excess spreads and margins in Africa compared to other 
regions.
8 Most striking is the difference from South Asian countries, such as Bangladesh, India, 
or Pakistan, which—in spite of similar challenges in governance and volatility—are all in better 
positions to exploit scale economies. In spite of high costs and high risks, banks are, however, 
very profitable (Figure 6). Indeed, subsidiaries of foreign banks in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
higher returns on assets and equity than subsidiaries of the same banks in other regions of the 
world.
9 This trend will most likely be even stronger in the months and years to come, as global 
investors’ risk appetite is fading. This might reflect partly the very high risks of banking in 
Africa and partly the lack of competition. This lack of competition in turn, is again related to the 
lack of scale in most African financial systems, which limits the number of financial institutions 
that an economy can sustain. However, it is also related to the widespread incidence of 
informality, which reduces the base of potential clients of the formal financial system.  
                                                            
8 Honohan and Beck 2007; Beck and Hesse 2009. 
9 Honohan and Beck 2007.  6
Banking is also very expensive for deposit customers, as reflected by very high minimum 
balance requirements and annual fees not only for checking customers but even for savings 
account holders in many African countries (see Figure 7).
10 Moreover, these high costs alone can 
explain why less than 20 percent of the population in many African countries has a bank account. 
Using simple back-of-the-envelope calculations, Beck et al. show that 54 percent of the 
population in Cameroon, 81 percent in Kenya, 40 percent in Madagascar, 94 percent in Malawi, 
89 percent in Sierra Leone, and 93 percent in Uganda cannot afford the fees for checking 
accounts, given their annual income and the assumption that they cannot spend more than 2 
percent of household income on financial transaction account charges.
11  
High fees, however, are only one factor behind the limited outreach of Africa’s financial 
systems. High documentation requirements to open an account—that is, the need to present 
several documents of identification, such as passport, pay slip, utility bill, and so on, also 
represent significant barriers given that large parts of the population live and work in the 
informal sector. Africa again stands out along this dimension, as becomes obvious from Figure 8. 
Similarly, physical access is limited, as the low bank branch and ATM penetration numbers for 
Africa illustrate.  
The gap between Africa and other regions of the world is even starker in other parts of 
the financial systems. Only a third of countries in the region have stock markets, which are 
mostly small and illiquid (Figure 9). The actual float of the listed companies is low. The low 
transaction volume in both primary and secondary markets is self-enforcing, as it deters new 
                                                            
10 Beck et al. 2008; World Bank, 2008. 
11 Beck et al. 2008. The 2 percent assumption is based on Genesis 2005. Fees on savings accounts are typically 
lower and many of these countries also have (postal) savings banks that offer basic accounts, but these accounts 
typically do not have the same functionality and many savings banks offer services of limited quality—that is, long 
queues and limited access to funds.   7
issuers. Only 13 African countries have seen corporate bond issues; in all these cases, the issues 
have been highly concentrated in the telecommunications and banking sectors.
12 While there 
have been some signs of improvement, such as large initial public offerings (IPOs) on the 
Ghanaian, Kenyan, and Nigerian stock exchanges, it is unlikely that these advances will make 
capital markets sustainable. Attempts at establishing regional markets have been less successful 
than expected, as the example of the regional exchange in Abidjan shows, as do the continuous 
political struggles related to creating a similar regional exchange for the Central African 
Monetary Union.  
However, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have not only seen economic growth 
pick up in recent years, but financial deepening and broadening have occurred in them as well. 
While this might be partly driven by demand and partly by international capital inflows, 
improvements in the institutional framework of finance—such as the establishment of 
commercial courts and alternative dispute resolution systems, the establishment or improvement 
of collateral registries and credit reference bureaus, and macroeconomic stability—have certainly 
contributed to this improvement. Stronger confidence in Africa’s financial systems is also 
reflected in the quintupling of private capital inflows over the period 2000 to 2007;
13 these 
surpassed donor inflows for the first time in 2006, thus reversing a long-term trend. This surge of 
private capital into Africa was part of increased capital flows to emerging markets resulting from 
the worldwide liquidity glut. However, as cross-country comparisons show,
14 these flows partly 
also reflect improved macroeconomic fundamentals in many African countries, such as 
macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline. When looking behind this aggregate, however, one 
                                                            
12 IMF 2008.  
13 IMF 2008. 
14 IMF 2008.  8
notes that capital flows are concentrated in specific countries and sectors, such as natural 
resource extraction, thus benefiting only narrow parts of the economy and society.  
Standard indicators of financial intermediary development, such as liquid liabilities to 
GDP, bank deposits to GDP, and private credit to GDP have demonstrated financial deepening in 
most African countries over the past years (Figure 10). As credit has been growing faster than 
deposits in most countries, financial intermediation—that is, the extent to which banks 
intermediate society’s savings into private credit—has also increased, although from very low 
levels. Efficiency and profitability indicators, on the other hand, have shown no clear trend over 
the past years, with the median fluctuating, pointing to continuous problems of scale and 
competitiveness.  
The improvement in banking system indicators and continued weakness in financial 
markets is consistent with the status of African financial sectors as bank- rather than market-
based systems. The focus of financial policymakers on improving the infrastructure necessary for 
sound and efficient banking—such as establishing credit registries, upgrading collateral 
registries, and improving creditor rights—is thus consistent with level of economic and financial-
sector development in Africa. An overemphasis on capital market development, on the other 
hand, would be premature, given that the necessary legal and regulatory conditions are not in 
place and—most importantly—the necessary demand from corporations is lacking. Furthermore, 
international experience suggests that small economies have an increasingly difficult time 
supporting liquid stock exchanges in a global economy, independent of their income level, as 
stock exchanges are subject to scale and network economies.
15 The more successful large 
enterprises across the developing world increasingly list abroad at a few exchanges, be it through 
                                                            
15 Domowitz et al. 2001.  9
cross-listing or through issue of American Depository Receipts and General Depository Receipts. 
Within Africa, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange will most likely be the only stock market able 
to sustain sufficient scale in the years to come, and even that only in cooperation with stock 
exchanges in Europe and North America. On the other hand, there is a need to mobilize long-
term resources locally—for example, for infrastructure projects—which will require a 
comprehensive policy package, including pension reform.  
Although not documented in a statistical sense, there seems to have been progress in 
expanding outreach as well. Technological advances have allowed Sub-Saharan Africa to 
leapfrog, as, for instance, in utilizing mobile telephone technology for expanding the share of 
population having access to payment services, as the example of M-Pesa in Kenya has shown. 
Banks across the region are offering innovative financial and low-cost products and utilize new 
technologies to reach out to larger shares of the population (Box 1). As we will discuss below, 
changes in market structure seem to have resulted in more innovative marketplaces in several 
countries, with a number of banks attempting new ways and products to expand outreach.  
Box 1: The impact of the financial crisis on Africa 
Although the direct impact of the current crisis in the United States and Europe on African 
financial systems is relatively contained—given that African banks are not as closely integrated in the 
global financial system as other regions of the developing world and hold most of their assets and 
commitments on rather than off the balance sheet—indirect effects through the real economy and through 
reduced private capital inflows caused by reduced risk appetite might very well have negative 
repercussions for real and financial sectors in Africa.  
African banks are, on average, not exposed to risks arising from complex derivative instruments 
or products.  They have typically low loan-deposit ratios and high liquidity reserves.  Unlike in several 
European countries—and with the notable exception of South Africa—there is also very limited  10
household lending, at the core of the financial crisis in the United States and other developed economies. 
And, unlike other emerging economies, African banks typically do not rely on foreign borrowing to 
finance their domestic lending.  To the contrary, subsidiaries of European parent banks typically have net 
foreign asset positions. 
There will be important second-round effects, however, through international trade channels. 
Reduced worldwide demand for African exports, both commodities and other exports, will dampen 
economic growth and might thus expose financial system to increased credit risk.  The economic crisis in 
the United States and Europe will most likely also lead to a reduction in remittance flows. Reduced 
capital flows and increased lending risk can lead to a tightening of credit conditions and reduced access to 
credit. Collapsing equity prices can weaken financial sectors where banks have made loans to clients to 
purchase shares, as in Nigeria.   
A second significant risk can arise through the channel of international capital flows.  Like the 
rest of the developing world, Africa has recently benefited from the global liquidity glut, attracting 
significant capital inflows, especially in countries with large natural resources.  With such flows predicted 
to decrease substantially in 2009, this will affect African economies significantly.  The decrease in 
commodity prices will therefore hit commodity exporters twice—through reduced earnings and reduced 
capital inflows. Given the small size of African financial systems, even a small absolute drop in capital 
inflows can have a relatively large effect on these markets. The resistance of remittance flows—although 
these are also showing signs of weakness—to the economic downturn might mitigate its negative impact 
somewhat.   
The large share of foreign-owned banks across Africa has brought stability over the past years, as 
we discuss, but also exposes the region to additional contagion risk.  The crisis could possibly be 
transmitted to Sub-Saharan Africa if financial distress among parent foreign banks in Western Europe 
leads either to a withdrawal of capital or to a calling in of loans made to their African subsidiaries.  The 
first scenario seems unlikely, given the low levels of equity that European banks have in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the high returns on this equity, but because of the seriousness of the current predicament it  11
cannot be excluded that cash-strapped foreign banks could withdraw capital as the crisis continues to 
unfold.  In addition, the appetite for further investment might be significantly reduced. While the second 
scenario seems more likely, the overall dependence on foreign subsidiaries in Africa on parent bank 
funding is relatively low. The recent rise of pan-African banks might reduce the contagion risk from 
European banks, but to the extent that the home economies of these banks—mostly from Nigeria and 
South Africa—are also affected by the crisis, this might actually introduce additional contagion risk.  
There will also be more lasting and perhaps serious impacts of the financial crisis in the more 
medium term, due to mounting pressures to lessen the impact of the crisis through fiscal stimulus, when 
the shallow depth of local sovereign and corporate debt markets result in rapid crowding out of private-
sector lending by the banks, thus undoing recent years’ deepening of private access to credit.  Pressures 
may also arise—particularly in those countries exposed to the commodity price collapse—to bail out 
problem institutions suffering from rapid growth in non-performing loans.  Finally, pressure will surely 
mount to intervene directly to support particularly vulnerable sectors through subsidized or directed 
credit. 
A final—and somewhat collateral—impact can come through both changes in the overall 
international regulatory architecture, following the current crisis and currently under discussion in the 
G20 forum, as well as through repercussions from emergency measures taken in the United States and 
Europe on financial-sector policy debate in Africa.  Take first the reform of the international regulatory 
architecture.  There might be an impact through risk ratings for emerging market debt, which in turn 
makes lending to developing countries more expensive and less attractive.  Similarly, higher capital 
requirements for large international banks might make them more reluctant to invest in developing 
country subsidiaries. Finally, the way weak banks in Europe are being resolved—nationalization or 
mergers—might have an impact on their subsidiaries in Africa. 
In addition, the recent emergency measures in the United States and Europe—including 
widespread nationalization and bailouts—might have negative repercussions for financial-sector policy 
dialogue throughout the developing world, as they seem to suggest that government ownership and  12
heavy-handed government intervention into the financial sector are again in vogue.  While the final 
verdict on these different measures is still out, in as much as they are temporary they do not invalidate the 
general financial policy paradigm that has arisen in recent years.  Governance failures and aggressive risk 
taking has taken place both in privately owned and government-owned financial institutions. The current 
crisis is the result not of too little but rather of misguided regulation that left out large parts of the 
financial system (investment banks and the “shadow financial markets”) and relied on industries such as 
the credit rating agencies that had perverse incentives to overstate quality of securities.  Finally, moral 
hazard on a macro-level (“Greenspan-Bernanke-put”)
 i and on a micro-level (such as “too-big-to-fail” 
policies, the push for aggressive lending through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, etc.) have significantly 
contributed to the boom and subsequent bust. An emphasis on heavy-handed regulation and restrictions 
on financial institutions and markets is therefore not called for.  Further, the harmful experience of 
decades of bank government ownership is in no way negated. 
However, while financial underdevelopment seems, prima-facie, to help countries isolate 
themselves against immediate contagion risks, it also reduces the ability of the real economy to cushion 
the impact of the current crisis. Cross-country experience has shown that a critical function of financial 
system is to diversify risk not only across firms but also over time, and a robust system can help smooth 
the impact of shocks.
ii  
 
Source: This box is based on background work by Antonio David, Smita Wagh, Giulia Pellegrini, and 
Uzma Khalil from the World Bank. 
 
i) This refers to the expectations of financial institutions and other financial market participants to be bailed out in 
times of widespread fragility, expectation that have been mostly fulfilled. 
ii) Bacchetta and Caminal 2000 
  13
The next two sections will discuss the role of government and the integration of financial 
systems into the international financial markets, respectively. We will draw on the existing 
literature, experiences across Africa, and experiences from other developing regions of the world 
to discuss the proper role of government and an adequate reaction to the trends toward 
globalization.  
 
3. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
One of the most controversial issues in financial-sector policies has been the proper role 
of government. This debate in Africa is largely parallel to discussions in other regions of the 
world. It started with a prominent role for governments after independence in the 1960s and 
1970s, followed by a withdrawal of government in many countries in the 1980s and 1990s. By 
now, a consensus is emerging that again sees a prominent role for governments, beyond 
providing macroeconomic stability and the institutional framework, by taking a more active but 
market-friendly approach.  
Supported by international financial institutions, in the 1960s and 1970s governments had 
traditionally a decisive role in African financial systems, ranging from regulatory restrictions 
(interest rate ceilings and floors, etc.) to directed credit programs and government ownership of 
banks and development finance institutions (DFIs). This activist approach aimed at replacing 
markets that did not exist at the time of independence, with governments being directly involved 
in providing financial services. The goal was to support sectors and industries that were 
traditionally shut out of the market-based financial system, such as agriculture, small-scale 
industries, and industries depending on long-term finance.   14
The outcome of these market-replacing efforts has been disappointing, both on the 
financial- and the real-sector sides. This can be explained by flaws in the two main assumptions 
of the market-replacing approach. The first is that governments know better than markets, and 
the second is that governments act in the best interest of society. Both assumptions have been 
proven wrong across the developed and developing world. Bureaucrats have turned out to have 
limited knowledge and expertise for running financial institutions and systems and they do not 
maximize society’s welfare, but are rather subject to political and regulatory capture—that is, 
influence from the political sphere and the regulated entities, as hypothesized by the private-
interest view.
16  
Again following the advice of international financial institutions, many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa started liberalizing and privatizing their financial systems in the 1980s and 1990s. 
While the Washington Consensus cannot be exactly seen as a laissez-faire approach, it puts a 
heavy emphasis on markets over government. There is a focus on monetary stability, market-
based price finding, and market-based provision of financial services. At the same time, 
disenchantment with the DFIs resulted in drying up of donor funding for these institutions.  
Sub-Saharan Africa has made significant progress in monetary stability. With the 
exception of a few outliers, most notably Zimbabwe, the majority of African countries has 
achieved inflation below 20 percent over the past few years. Sub-Saharan Africa has also made 
substantial progress in private ownership of banks. With a few exceptions—such as Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, and Togo—most countries’ banking systems are today dominated by privately owned 
financial institutions, be they domestic or foreign.  
                                                            
16 Barth et al. 2006.  15
These reforms and their achievements in monetary stability and private ownership, 
however, have only partly fulfilled their promise. African financial systems are significantly 
more stable than before. The write-down of bad loans has led to a shrinking of the financial 
systems in some countries, but overall financial intermediation has improved in many countries. 
As discussed above, many countries have started to reap the benefits of reforms of the 1990s that 
were politically often difficult. Despite this progress, however, Africa’s financial systems are 
still characterized by their shallowness; by their high costs, exemplified by high interest rate 
spreads; and by limited access to finance, as maintained in the previous section.  
Disappointment with some of the outcomes of the modernist approach adopted through 
the past two decades of African financial-sector reforms has fostered yet another swing back 
toward more government involvement. This time around, however, African governments have 
leaned more toward a market-friendly role that creates and enables markets instead of trying to 
replace them.  
Over the past 10 years, there has been increasing emphasis on going beyond macro-
stability toward strengthening the underlying institutions to build an efficient and stable financial 
system, including robust contractual and informational frameworks and incentive-compatible 
regulation and supervision. This policy approach can be referred to as a market-developing 
approach—creating markets rather than replacing them (see Box 2). Unlike both the activist and 
modernist agendas of previous decades, the agenda of this new market-developing approach is 
daunting, as it involves long-term institution building. It ranges from developing the contractual 
framework to informational requirements (such as accounting and disclosure standards) and 
strengthened bank regulation and supervision. It goes beyond transplanting laws and rules from 
the developed world to building up local capacity and norms. The role of governments in this  16
context is a difficult one—it entails going beyond setting the rules, but without suppressing 
private initiative.  
Box 2: Deepening and broadening financial system: A taxonomy of policies 
To understand the role and impact of different government policies on deepening and broadening 
financial systems, Beck and de la Torre suggest a taxonomy that builds on the concept of the Access 
Possibilities Frontier—the maximum commercially viable outreach of a country’s financial system given 
certain “state variables” that do not change in the short term, such as market size; macroeconomic 
fundamentals; available technology; the quality of the transport and communication infrastructure; the 
effectiveness of the contractual and informational frameworks; and the degree of general insecurity 
associated with crime, violence, terrorism, and so on.
i  One can then identify the problem of the financial 
system as being either below or unsustainably beyond the frontier or facing a frontier too low relative to 
countries of comparable levels of economic development.  The types of access problem can be mapped 
into different policy options that focus on (1) developing, (2) enabling, or (3) harnessing markets.  These 
different policies all contrast with market-replacing policies, which have mostly led to financial-sector 
deepening that is unsustainable, if any deepening at all.  
If the main problem is that of too low an access possibilities frontier, the policies to highlight 
would be market-developing policies, that is, those that aim at improving the state variables and moving 
the frontier and thus involve fundamental reforms such as improving macroeconomic stability, building a 
privately owned financial system, and improving the contractual framework.  In some countries, non–
financial- sector policies, such as improving security or upgrading the transport and communication 
infrastructure, might be the critical areas to push out the frontier. 
Changes in the state variables involve changes in fundamental institutions and, thus, take a long 
time to materialize.  To the extent that a financial system is operating below the possibilities frontier, 
there is room for market-enabling policies that might help deepen and broaden the financial system even 
in the absence of perceptible changes in state variables.  Where the main reason for being below the  17
possibilities frontier is the demand problem of self-exclusion, the appropriate policies would emphasize 
raising financial literacy, both for households as for enterprises.  If—as is more likely—the main 
problems reside with sub-optimization in credit supply, a wider range of policy options can be considered, 
starting with competition policy, allowing entry from reputable market players and securing access to the 
payment system for all financial institutions.  This also includes reviewing barriers stemming from bank 
regulation and AML/CFT regulation that might reduce banks’ appetite for expanding lending and their 
customer bases.  
A third category of government policies, defined as market-harnessing, tries to prevent the 
financial system from moving to an unsustainable equilibrium beyond the frontier because of imprudent 
lending. Market-harnessing policies therefore aim at keeping banks’ incentives to take aggressive risks in 
check through a mix of measures aimed at strengthening market and supervisory discipline. Market-
harnessing policies are also important on the demand side to avoid predatory lending, which results in 
unsustainable overborrowing by individual borrowers. 
i) Beck and de la Torre, 2007.  
 
The institution-building agenda in the contractual system is substantial and reflects the 
deficiencies in the respective laws and their enforcing institutions. It ranges from modernizing 
bankruptcy legislation to improving the court system or building alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms and establishing or improving asset and collateral registries. Few countries in Africa 
currently have credit registries or credit reference bureaus, an indispensable part of an effective 
and competitive system of financial intermediation. Many central banks and regulatory 
authorities still do not have political and operational independence; they have limited supervisory 
skills and lack the required enforcement powers. 
Recent cross-country research has helped identify some priorities within the institution-
building agenda. Specifically, improvements in the contractual framework, such as creditor  18
rights, have a relatively larger effect on financial intermediation in high-income countries, while 
improving credit registries has a relatively larger impact on financial deepening in low-income 
countries.
17 A second piece of evidence on reform prioritization comes from the transition 
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Focusing on enforcement mechanisms for simple 
contractual arrangements such as collateral recovery can result in more benefits than reforming 
more complicated multi-stakeholder conflicts such as bankruptcy.
18  
In addition, legal system reforms have to be context-specific, particularly with respect to 
the legal tradition. In spite of their shortcomings and deficiencies, court systems in the former 
British colonies still have a reasonable reputation. They can rely on a large body of case law and 
precedents, from London and other parts of the former British Empire. What courts in many 
common-law countries in Africa are lacking are capacity and financial sector–specific skills. The 
introduction of commercial courts might be helpful in this context. The situation in most Civil 
Code countries in Africa is different, as courts in these countries have deficiencies along many 
dimensions and suffer from very low reputations. In these countries, establishing alternative 
dispute resolution systems might be more helpful.  
Cross-country comparisons using Doing Business indicators show that Africa has made 
progress in reforming the contractual and information framework. The average cost of contract 
enforcement across Sub-Saharan Africa has dropped from 56 percent of a typical debt contract in 
2003 to 49 percent in 2008, while it has increased from 28 percent to 29 percent in the rest of the 
world. Such diverse countries as Ghana, Mozambique, and Rwanda have implemented reforms 
to reduce the number of procedures and the time it takes to enforce a contract. While there has 
been only little progress in establishing new credit registries over the past years, the existing 
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ones, both private and public, have expanded their penetration (Figure 11). Although these 
numbers are often driven by a few reform-minded governments, such reforms can have 
important demonstration and contagion effects across the region.  
  Beyond institution building, there are other shortcuts that have been identified through 
experience and that can be summarized under the heading market-enabling policies (Box 2). 
Creating the necessary legal and regulatory frameworks for leasing and factoring is among them, 
as both financing techniques are especially conducive for small- and medium-sized enterprise 
(SME) lending. The regulatory and supervisory framework can also be an important lever for 
financial deepening and broadening, beyond its important stability role. Specifically, the 
regulatory framework can critically influence the degree of competition and innovation in a 
financial system. Allowing entry from new reputable market players, be they domestic or 
foreign, can be important to maintain contestability and competition, especially in small financial 
markets. Adjusting loan classification and capital requirements so as not to bias against 
agricultural or SME loans can be important, as the following two examples illustrate. Adapting 
the loan classification system to allow bullet loans rather than forcing quarterly repayments can 
help agricultural lending synchronize with farming cycles. The lower tail risk of SME loans—
that is, the lower probability of very high loan losses—would imply lower capital charges for 
SME lending in spite of their higher overall riskiness.
19 Another important area of competition 
where government action might be necessary is that of ensuring access to payment systems and 
other network services on an equal basis for all financial institutions—incumbent and new—that 
qualify under fit and proper criteria. Finally, the current push for and implementation of tougher 
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations has 
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critical repercussions not just for financial integrity and stability, but also has potentially 
negative consequences for the deepening and broadening of the financial system. 
Sometimes the role of government in fostering access might have to go beyond 
competition policies and take the form of affirmative regulatory policy. Examples include the 
moral suasion exercised by authorities to make South African banks introduce the Mzansi (basic 
transaction) Account. Inducing banks to share or ensure interoperability of payments 
infrastructures (including ATM networks) can help avoid undesirable competition on access to 
infrastructure while enhancing desirable competition on price and quality of service, thereby 
facilitating the achievement of cost-reducing scale economies and lowering entry barriers to new 
financial service providers. 
Moral suasion can be an important policy lever, but has its limitations. Larger countries 
with larger potential markets might have an easier time coaxing their banks into taking certain 
actions (such as establishing basic transaction accounts or opening up network services) than 
smaller markets. Further, there is a fine line between moral suasion and political interference, as 
the recent example of Uganda has shown. Frustrated by the disappointing results of earlier 
attempts to increase access to financial services, in early 2006 the Ugandan government 
announced its intention that each district should be serviced by at least one financial institution. 
In those districts where no financial service provider was in operation, the government mandated 
the establishment of savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) to be supported with payments, 
services, and so on supplied by the poorly managed government-owned Postal Savings Bank.  
Market-enabling policies can also try addressing hindrances such as coordination failures, 
first mover disincentives, and obstacles to risk distribution and sharing. Although not easy to 
define in general terms, given their variety, these government interventions tend to share a  21
common feature in supporting incentives for private lenders and investors to engage without 
unduly shifting risks and costs to the government.
20 These market-promoting interventions also 
provide a new role for existing DFIs beyond retail lending, although their success will require 
adjustments in their business models and governance structures. 
One of the major challenges with any government-based solution is establishing a 
governance structure that avoids political capture of the program and expropriation of the 
benefits by the few connected. This is where donors as well as regional institutions can play an 
important role, as they are more removed from direct political pressure on the national level.
21  
In the context of the on-going global crisis, market-harnessing policies are again on the 
top of policymakers’ agenda. There seems to be a need to strengthen crisis-preparedness 
including cooperation between authorities—such as central banks, ministries of finance, deposit 
insurers, court judges, tax authorities, and so on—in designing and implementing financial 
institution resolution practices. Lender-of-last-resort, liquidity management, and payment 
systems routines and infrastructure are often ill-prepared in Sub-Saharan Africa, cumbersome in 
operation, and highly discretionary. Bank resolution practices are often open to endless, arbitrary 
court challenges, and deposit insurance schemes are slow to pay out depositors and unable to 
liquidate efficiently, if at all. Thus, by improving their crisis-preparedness, African countries will 
                                                            
20 An analysis of this type of “market-friendly roles for the visible hand” in Latin America is found in De la Torre et 
al.(2007), which presents case studies of such intriguing examples as: (1) the creation of an Internet-based market 
for the discounting of post-delivery receivables by SMEs in Mexico; (2) a Chilean program to promote lending to 
SMEs via the auctioning of partial government guarantees; and (3) a variety of structured finance packages 
orchestrated by a Mexican development fund to finance agricultural production (e.g., shrimp, corn). Examples in 
Africa might include the partial credit guarantee, with 50-50 risk sharing, established by the Bank of Tanzania, and 
the World Bank-supported Africa Trade Insurance Facility. Another important area where DFIs can help is in 
infrastructure financing, where private market players are often reluctant to enter given political and economic 
uncertainty and the current global crisis has reduced the necessary risk appetite for foreign investors even further. 
The role of the Development Bank of South Africa in catalyzing private participation in projects at the municipal 
level is also an interesting example to study. 
21 Learning from positive examples within the region is also important in this context. The governance structure of 
the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) has been studied extensively in this context (Scott 2007). The 
African Association of DFIs has also established a set of governance guidelines.  22
not only be able to improve their ability to respond to possible immediate difficulties, but can 
also address long-standing development needs supporting the preservation of asset values in 
situations where financial institutions must undergo restructuring or be resolved. 
 
4. THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
Integration into international financial markets has been a second important and 
controversial aspect of financial-sector policy over the past decades. Although capital account 
restrictions are still in place in many countries, these are often more de-jure than de-facto. And 
while capital account liberalization has many benefits, it has to be managed carefully on the 
macroeconomic level and accompanied with appropriate regulatory policies. The benefits of 
increased capital inflows will be reaped only in the presence of well-developed local financial 
institutions and markets, but capital inflows can in turn accelerate financial and institutional 
deepening.
22 As in the case of government interventions, a context-specific and pragmatic 
approach is therefore called for.
23 
While there has been a focus on opening capital accounts toward developed countries, the 
potential of regional financial integration has been much less exploited, although there are large 
economies of scale to be reaped by cooperation in technical areas such as harmonizing 
approaches to bank regulation or payment systems.
24 Reducing if not eliminating intra-regional 
capital account restrictions can help deepen and broaden financial systems within the region. It 
allows more efficient risk diversification for financial and non-financial corporations alike. It can 
help overcome the scale problem for financing large projects, such as those in infrastructure. 
                                                            
22 See Kose et al. 2009 for a more detailed discussion on the threshold values for benefits from capital account 
liberalization and its “collateral” benefits.  
23 For a more in depth discussion, see Beck et al. 2009.  
24 World Bank 2007b.  23
While reducing dependence on international capital markets to a certain degree, such intra-
regional capital account liberalization seems less risky than complete capital account 
liberalization vis-à-vis international investors.  
Unlike capital account liberalization, foreign bank entry has been less controversial in the 
academic literature, though more so in the political arena. At the time of independence, most 
Sub-Saharan African countries started with foreign bank–dominated banking systems but 
subsequently nationalized them. After the disappointment with government-owned banks, many 
countries started privatizing again. In many countries, privatization was to foreign banks, since 
there were no domestic resources and skills. While in the mid-1990s less than a quarter of 
banking systems were dominated by foreign-owned banks and many countries still had 
predominantly government-owned banking systems, by 2005, more than half of the region’s 
countries had a banking market with either a dominant or a significant share of foreign-owned 
financial institutions (Figure 12). 
Foreign bank entry has several advantages that are specific to Africa: international banks 
can help foster governance, they can bring in much-needed technology and experience from 
other parts of the region (in case of South African or Nigerian banks), and they can help exploit 
scale economies in their small host economies (Box 3). Where increasing the role of foreign 
banks is part of a broader reform strategy to build and deepen the necessary institutional 
infrastructure for financial deepening and broadening, as discussed above, foreign bank entry can 
be a catalyst for improvement.  
Box 3: International experience with foreign bank entry 
The market share of foreign-owned banks has increased across the developing world over the past 
20 years, especially in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. This entry has been partly fostered 
by financial liberalization in the host countries and partly by the need for the recapitalization of failed  24
government-owned banks.  The variation across countries and over time has allowed an assessment of the 
impact of foreign bank entry on depth, efficiency, stability, and access in the host countries. 
Foreign bank entry and participation has, more often than not, had a positive effect on efficiency 
and stability of host countries’ financial systems, with varying effects on outreach.
i  Cross-country 
evidence has confirmed that foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic banks in developing 
countries, and that foreign bank entry can indeed exert competitive pressure on domestic banks to become 
more efficient except in economies where small size, high concentration, or regulatory restrictions on 
bank entry reduce contestability and competition.  Critically, foreign banks can help reduce connected and 
politicized lending, as they typically operate at arm’s length from the ruling political and economic elites 
of their host countries.  This can help improve competition in the real sector and overall governance in the 
economy.  Foreign banks can also have a stabilizing effect on host countries’ credit markets. Foreign 
banks typically show less volatile lending behavior and help smooth business cycles in the host 
economies, relying on deep pockets of their parent banks.   While contagion risk from foreign banks’ 
home countries to the host economies has appeared to be of little risk so far, the ongoing global crisis 
might change that.  
In terms of outreach, the experience is mixed, with the effect depending on the mode of entry 
(green field versus merger), retail orientation of the foreign bank, and, most importantly, the contractual 
and information frameworks and competitive environment in the host country. On the one hand, foreign 
banks have been known to bring in new lending techniques that can overcome information problems and 
high costs of lending small amounts, thus expanding access to these borrower groups.  On the other hand, 
in economies with weak contractual and informational frameworks, foreign banks might focus on large 
enterprises with tangible assets to use as collateral or international connections, thus shunning the small 
enterprise segment because they do not have access to the necessary soft information and relationship 
lending technique. But even if foreign banks are less inclined to serve small and medium-sized enterprises 
and poorer households, they do exert competitive pressures on domestic banks to go down market.  25
The empirical evidence of the impact of foreign banks on financial deepening and broadening has 
been mixed.  Bank-level evidence often points to the reluctance of foreign banks to cater to smaller 
enterprises, while firm-level evidence does not report any adverse effect of foreign bank entry for these 
firms.  The evidence also varies across regions, with the effect being overwhelmingly positive among 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, where foreign bank entry was part of a critical policy 
package to sever connections between financial sector and state-owned enterprises and overcome the 
banking fragility of the 1990s. The evidence of Latin America, on the other hand, is rather mixed, and 
very much a function of the competitive environment of the host country.  
i) See Cull and Martinez Peria 2007 for an overview. 
 
Foreign bank entry can help, but is not sufficient to improve the efficiency of 
intermediation and the availability of credit. There are many factors that can prevent countries 
from reaping the potential benefits of foreign bank ownership. The presence of dominant 
government-owned banks can reduce competitive pressures and allow other banks—domestic or 
foreign-owned—to earn rents from the inefficiency of government-owned banks, as the example 
of Kenya shows. The absence of a sound contractual and informational framework reduces the 
feasibility of small business lending, as seen in Zambia where lending to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP remains low despite two decades of financial liberalization. The small size of 
many financial markets in Sub-Saharan African markets might make foreign banks reluctant to 
incur the fixed costs of introducing new products and technologies. The small size of many 
markets also does not allow for the necessary competitive pressure. The result in many Sub-
Saharan African countries has been a concentration of both domestic and foreign banks’ 
portfolios on government papers and international assets and a shying away from private-sector 
lending.   26
Nevertheless, the recent new generation of foreign banks in Africa has been more 
beneficial for outreach. The new wave of foreign bank entry after liberalization in the 1980s and 
1990s has seen not only the return of old colonial banks but also some new important players, 
such as several South African banks; banks from non-African regions other than Europe; and 
several regional banks, such as the Bank of Africa and Ecobank. Several banks have established 
a franchise in supporting the development of financial access, such as the Dutch Rabobank with 
(controlling minority) stakes in banks in Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique; and more recently 
the Nigerian Access Bank, with a focus on improving access to finance by SMEs with 
subsidiaries in West Africa as well as in Kenya and Zambia. Many of these new entrants have 
put a much higher weight on sustainable outreach, introducing new products and technologies. 
The example of Uganda shows the positive impact that foreign bank entry can have on 
access to financial services in Africa. The South Africa Standard Bank purchased the largest 
government-owned bank after a first failed privatization and subsequent renationalization. Over 
the past years, Standard Bank did not only fulfill its commitment to not close any branches, it 
even opened new ones, and it increased lending to the agricultural sector.
25 However, this rather 
successful privatization also shows that foreign bank entry is not a panacea. Standard Bank still 
dominates the national banking market as well as many of the small up-country local markets. 
This lack of competition might have reduced the benefits arising from the shift from a 
government-dominated financial system to a privately owned financial system. 
In a nutshell, Africa has gained a great deal from foreign bank entry in the past decade, 
including from the entry of pan-African banks. Finance is now more sound and efficient, but 
foreign bank entry is not a universal remedy. Only in competitive environments with effective 
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contractual and especially informational frameworks can host economies and societies reap 
maximum benefits. The experience of the past decade has also shown that countries should 
choose their foreign banks carefully. Countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda had 
to renationalize their just-privatized banks as the foreign purchasers turned out to have 
insufficient resources or management skills. It was not until the second round that privatization 
was successful.
26 In spite of the overall stabilizing role of foreign bank participation, one should 
not downplay the risk of a foreign subsidiary dominating the financial system if the parent 
company is in trouble—a scenario that has become again more likely in the current global 
financial turmoil.  
Although beneficial for efficiency and outreach, the rising South-South financial 
integration also poses challenges for supervisory authorities. There is an increasingly pressing 
need to improve reporting, accounting, and disclosure practices, and also to develop and respect 
memoranda of understanding among supervisory bodies regarding exchange of information on 
the soundness of financial institutions. Although there are no signs of the withdrawal of foreign 
banks, the risk remains and supervisory authorities in Africa need to be aware of any such risks 
to be able to prevent or, if not prevent, to prepare for orderly exits, should they occur. 
Finally, the lack of regional integration has reduced the benefit that Sub-Saharan African 
countries can gain from foreign bank entry. By harmonizing bank regulatory frameworks, 
authorities could reduce regulatory costs for banks active across several countries of the 
respective region. Allowing banks to establish branches in other countries rather than having to 
establish subsidiaries could reduce the costs of market entry—by reducing costs of, among other 
aspects, multiple corporate structures—and foster competition. It is important to note, however, 
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that introducing such a “regional passport for financial services” approach requires at least 
supervisory convergence, if not integration, as the current crisis experience in Europe shows. 
 
5. LOOKING FORWARD 
Africa’s financial systems have seen deepening and broadening over the past years, the 
result not only of improvements in the macroeconomic and institutional framework, but also of 
the worldwide liquidity glut, which directed more capital flows into Africa. The current global 
crisis threatens to reverse this trend and undermine this recent progress. In these adverse 
circumstances, it is even more important to upgrade the necessary frameworks for sound, 
efficient, and inclusive financial systems. As we have discussed in this paper, this work calls for 
further institution building—such as judicial reform and the establishment and reform of 
collateral and credit registries—as well as cautious and context-specific government intervention 
to help financial market participants expand financial services to the frontier of commercially 
sustainable possibilities. Efforts to deepen financial sovereign and corporate bond markets need 
to be intensified, to improve the capacity for local debt financing, to provide instruments of 
suitable maturity and security for longer-term savings, and to facilitate the financing of African 
infrastructure.  
These market-enabling policies require strong authorities that take an active role in 
redefining regulatory frameworks to include competition, inclusion, and efficiency as goals, 
while crowding in rather than crowding out private initiative. In those situations where 
governments are called upon to intervene in financial markets, they have the opportunity to 
provide market-conforming interventions, such as partially guaranteeing credit to groups of 
borrowers, such as SMEs, that are vulnerable to crowding out, while encouraging private banks  29
to go further down-market and develop expertise in credit risk assessment. This policy approach 
implies a new role for development finance institutions on the wholesale and coordination level 
rather than retail lending. These policies also call for the embracing of technology to leapfrog in 
the attempt to broaden the outreach of the financial system. The fall-off in remittance flows 
intensifies pressure on governments to facilitate reduction in the pricing of remittance transfers 
by opening competition among money transfer operators, lessening the costs of the domestic leg 
of transfers through interoperability between payments service providers, and leveling the 
playing field between providers of mobile-banking services and similar services provided by 
banks. 
The current crisis also calls for a cautious approach to opening capital accounts. A 
premium should be put on regional integration to reap benefits from scale economies. While the 
time may not be right for opening capital accounts, the current crisis should not be used as a 
pretext for re-imposing capital controls, given the negative repercussions such controls have for 
macroeconomic discipline and governance. The region stands to gain a great deal from the 
presence of both global and regional financial institutions in terms of efficiency, competition, 
stability, and outreach. Foreign bank entry, however, is not a panacea and cannot substitute for 
the necessary domestic reforms. 
For better or worse, the future of Africa’s financial systems is closely linked to the 
development of global finance, as are its real economies. However, it is up to Africa’s financial 
sector stakeholders—bankers, donors, and policymakers—to guide financial sector reforms in a 
way that maximizes Africa’s opportunities.   30
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